The plan by Saudi Arabia to procure JF-17 Thunder fighter jets worth approximately USD 4 billion, with part of the fleet expected to be granted to Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Syria, has sparked wide-ranging debate across the region. The issue goes beyond military strengthening and opens strategic discussion on the possibility of technology transfer, or Transfer of Technology (ToT).
The JF-17 is a joint product of Pakistan and China, originally designed as a low-cost yet flexible multirole fighter aircraft. This character makes it attractive to developing countries seeking air power capabilities without full dependence on Western defense systems.
In the scenario being discussed, Saudi Arabia would act as the main buyer as well as a regional distribution hub. This position gives Riyadh strong bargaining power to negotiate ToT packages as an integral part of the procurement contract.
A realistic ToT model would be a tiered scheme, with Saudi Arabia or potentially Yemen or Sudan designated as primary hubs. Under this model, technology transfer would not be distributed directly to all recipient countries but would instead be centralized in Saudi industrial and military facilities.
Saudi Arabia could secure rights for final assembly, depot-level maintenance, and the establishment of a regional Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul center for the JF-17. In addition, training for technicians, engineers, and pilots would be conducted centrally to maintain control and security standards.
Recipient countries such as Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Syria would primarily be positioned as operators. They would receive fully assembled aircraft, logistical support, and basic operational training without access to core technologies.
This approach is widely viewed as the safest from a geopolitical perspective. Pakistan and China are generally more willing to provide limited ToT to Saudi Arabia than to states facing ongoing political instability and security challenges.
Compared with Western defense arrangements, the JF-17 ToT framework is relatively flexible. In programs such as the F-16, the United States strictly limits technology transfer, with even routine MRO activities often restricted to facilities approved by Washington.
In the case of France’s Rafale, ToT is more open in principle but comes at very high cost and remains restricted to certain sectors. Core weapons integration and avionics are typically retained under manufacturer control.
Sweden’s Gripen is widely regarded as the most progressive in terms of ToT, as demonstrated in Brazil. However, this model requires political stability, industrial capacity, and long-term commitment—conditions difficult to meet for conflict-affected states.
The JF-17 sits between these extremes. It offers practical ToT options, such as maintenance, non-strategic weapons integration, and industrial training, without exposing sensitive radar source codes or engine technologies.
For Saudi Arabia, this scheme aligns closely with Vision 2030, which prioritizes the localization of the defense industry. Control over maintenance chains and technical support provides long-term strategic value, including balancing the growing Israel–UAE axis in the Middle East and East Africa.
For countries like Yemen, the impact would be indirect but significant. Even without full ToT or hub status, Yemen could rebuild its air force around more standardized, disciplined, and professionally trained structures.
Beyond that, Yemen could gain access to regional training centers in Saudi Arabia, reducing reliance on fragmented and outdated operational models.
However, the success of such a scheme depends heavily on governance reform within Yemen’s defense sector. Without professionalism, transparency, and strong civilian oversight, the benefits of modern air platforms would be difficult to realize.
For this reason, military strengthening through the JF-17 should be accompanied by institutional reform. Modernizing equipment must go hand in hand with modernizing management and command structures.
At the regional level, Saudi Arabia’s move also reflects a diversification of strategic partnerships. Riyadh is no longer fully reliant on Western systems and is instead building a new industrial axis with Pakistan and China.
For Pakistan and China, the project opens access to a major market while expanding their geopolitical influence in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
Meanwhile, recipient states gain enhanced air defense capabilities without the heavy political conditionality often attached to Western military aid. This positions the JF-17 as a tool of stabilization rather than escalation.
Ultimately, the JF-17 package with limited ToT signals a shift in paradigm. It is not merely about purchasing fighter jets, but about building a more autonomous, controlled, and realistic regional defense ecosystem amid an evolving geopolitical landscape.
The Long History of Saudi Military Assistance
Saudi Arabia is not a newcomer to military assistance for allied states. Since the 1970s, Riyadh has pursued defense diplomacy in a distinctive way, not only by providing financial aid but by directly purchasing fighter aircraft and strategic weapons for its partners.
During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia supported North Yemen in strengthening its armed forces as part of broader efforts to counter rival ideological and regional influences. This support included arms procurement and long-term logistical assistance.
Similar measures were extended to Lebanon during periods of political and security crisis. Saudi Arabia leveraged its financial power to support Lebanon’s military institutions while preserving regional balance.
Morocco and Jordan also feature among Saudi Arabia’s long-standing security partners. In many cases, Riyadh’s assistance was not overtly public but materialized through defense procurement contracts facilitated by the kingdom.
Iraq, during certain periods of heightened regional tension, experienced similar patterns of Saudi backing. Riyadh viewed the stability of allied states as inseparable from its own national security.
Often overlooked is Saudi Arabia’s support for Pakistan. In the 1970s, Riyadh reportedly helped strengthen the Pakistan Air Force, including support for the acquisition of Chinese-made J-6 fighter aircraft.
This pattern underscores Saudi Arabia’s long-standing use of financial leverage as a strategic tool. Purchasing weapons for allies has been seen as more effective than deploying Saudi forces directly into conflict zones.
Today, this historical approach is resurfacing under new geopolitical conditions. Saudi plans to purchase and distribute aircraft and weaponry are widely seen as a continuation of an old strategy adapted to a new era.
The difference today lies in the strengthening Israel–United Arab Emirates axis. Growing military and intelligence cooperation between those two states has reshaped the regional balance of power and encouraged Saudi Arabia to reinforce its own circle of partners.
Within this landscape, Saudi policy is not merely about assistance but about signaling. Riyadh seeks to reaffirm itself as a central security actor, drawing on a long tradition of using military support as an instrument of influence and regional stabilization.
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